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Abstract
Background
Ghana introduced capitation payment method in 2012 but was faced with resistance from
provider groups and civil society organizations for its perceived negative effects on quality
care delivery. This study seeks to explore the views of providers to understand their pre-
ferred payment method for the various types of services they provide in order to inform the
discussion and negotiations during this period of reform. Findings will not only aid the
National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) to improve the implementation arrangements
but also provide useful inputs for other low and middle-income countries (LMICs) in their
quest to reform their provider payment systems.
Materials and methods
We conducted a cross-sectional survey of 200 credentialed health care providers’ in the
three regions of Ghana on providers’ preference for payment method. We administered
closed-ended questionnaires employing 5-point Likert scales for measurement of payment
method preference. Descriptive and regression analysis were performed to examine health-
care providers’ background characteristics and their association with preferred payment
method for primary care.
Results
In general, health care providers prefer the Ghana-Diagnosis-Related Grouping (G-DRG)
payment method to fee-for-service and capitation payment methods. Result of bivariate
analyses showed that healthcare providers’ preference for payment method for primary out-
patient services differed significantly by their region of residence (p<0.001). The multinomial
logic model showed that being a female (p = 0.013) or healthcare provider in the Volta region
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(p = 0.008) was significantly associated with health provider preference for G-DRG payment
method relative to fee-for-service. Similarly, being a healthcare provider in the Volta region
(p = 0.026) or Medical Assistant (p = 0.032) was significantly associated with capitation rela-
tive to fee-for-service payment method.
Conclusion
We conclude that the most preferred payment method across all regions is the G-DRG. How-
ever, whereas providers in the Volta region are not willing to accept capitation as payment
method, this was not the case in Ashanti and Central regions. Capitation payment method as an
option for primary care services in Ghana should, therefore, not be ruled out of the discussion.
Introduction
As demand for health care increases within the context of budgetary constraints, governments
are motivated to implement cost-efficiency measures to ensure continuous delivery of quality
health care to their populace [1]. At point of service, two efficiency-gains incentives may be
applied to contain cost: demand-side incentives to reduce moral hazard and supply-side incen-
tives to induce efficient application of resources [2]. Supply-side, as opposed to demand-side
incentives, are deemed a better option because while the demand side incentives, such as co-
payments, could impose financial hardship on care seekers, supply-side incentives could
induce providers to be cost-conscious in order to control expenditure [2]. One such supply-
side incentive is reform of the provider payment system.
Ghana introduced a National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in 2003 after initial pilot in
45 districts between 2002 and 2003. At the start of full scale implementation of the Scheme the
NHIA paid its credentialed providers by fee-for-service method. In 2008, the Authority began
payment reforms by introducing diagnosis-related grouping (DRG) method for services at all
level of care delivery while maintaining fee-for-service for medicines. On realising that the fee-
for-service and the DRG payment methods could not help control the observed escalating
growth in utilization and claims expenditures, the National Health Insurance Authority
(NHIA), which is the regulator, decided to introduce capitation payment for primary care ser-
vices. Having learned from other experiences that capitation drives down cost [3],[4], serves as
critical source of income for providers [5], promotes adherence to guidelines and policies [6]
and encourages providers to work better and give health education to patients [7], the NHIA
was not oblivious of the fact that capitation is noted to induce reduction in the quantity and
quality of care provided [5], encourage skimming on inputs, “dumping” of high risk patients
and negatively affect patient-provider relationship [8]. The NHIA was, however, convinced
that notwithstanding any un-intended negative effect, with a robust monitoring and evaluation
system, implementation of capitation payment could contribute to addressing the cost escala-
tion challenge that was being experienced under the G-DRG and fee-for-service payment
methods. Capitation payment was, therefore, introduced as a pilot project in January 2012 in
the Ashanti region of Ghana in order to identify un-intended implementation challenges to
inform its re-design for step-wise implementation across the country.
The introduction of capitation payment in the Ashanti region was, however, met with resis-
tance from provider groups led by the leadership of their professional associations. The leader-
ship of the faith-based health care provider groups was, however, supportive of the capitation
payment method as the Executive Director of Christian Health Association of Ghana (CHAG)
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was reported to have stated that “our pledged support (for capitation payment) is premised on
the belief that the pilot has the vibrant objective to promote efficiency of health facilities, intro-
duce managed competition, ensure continuity of care, and also ensure cost containment for pay-
ers as well as ensuring financial sustainability of the health facilities without compromising
quality of care” (The Ghanaian Times Newspaper of 27/01.2012). Evidence from literature
shows that tension between providers and reformers of the payment system tend to slow down
the reform process and that such reforms require the intense involvement of all stakeholders,
both in the preparation, and implementation of the reform in order to achieve the intended
objective [9].
In the midst of a divided opinion of provider groups on the capitation implementation, the
desire of the NHIA to reform its payments methods, and the need to accommodate genuine
concerns of provider groups to ensure success of the reform agenda, we found it useful to
explore the views of providers to understand their preferred payment method for the various
types of services they provide. This study would, therefore, provide evidence to inform the dis-
cussion and negotiations during this period of reform. Findings will not only aid the NHIA to
improve the implementation arrangements but also provide useful inputs for other low and
middle-income countries (LMICs) in their quest to reform their provider payment systems.
Materials and methods
Study design
We conducted a cross-sectional survey of 200 credentialed health care providers’ in the three
regions of Ghana on providers’ preference for payment method. We administered closed-
ended questionnaires on the 200 credentialed providers in the three regions (Ashanti, Volta
and Central) using face-to-face interview. Data on the main subject of study centered on pro-
vider preference for payment method and their attitude towards the capitation payment policy.
We also collected data on the socio-demographic characteristics of respondents.
Research setting
The study took place in three regions of Ghana: Ashanti, Volta and Central regions. Capitation
payment policy which is the subject of study was first introduced in the Ashanti region in 2012
and was therefore selected as the “intervention” region for the study. Table 1 below provides
the basic socio-demographic and health service/NHIS data on the three regions.
Population and sampling
The NHIS-credentialed providers constituted the study population from which a sample was
drawn for interviews. The sample size was calculated based on number of providers creden-
tialed in 2013, the year when the study was designed; and we used the G-power analysis pro-
gramme (G� Power 3.1) [10], [11] to determine the appropriate sample size. We assumed an
effect size of 0.4, an alpha (α) of 0.05 and beta (1-β) of 0.80; and allocation ratio (N2/N1) of
1.1. The outputs were 200 samples: 95 for group one (Ashanti (intervention) region) and 105
for group two (Central and Volta (control) regions). Based on the number of NHIS-creden-
tialed providers as at the end of year 2013, we then, proportionally, allocated 48% of samples
for group two to Volta region and 52% to Central region.
Data analysis
We performed descriptive analysis of healthcare providers’ socio-demographic characteristics.
We then performed chi-square test to determine relationship between providers’ region of
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residence and their preferred payment method for the various types of services provided
under the NHIS in order to understand whether capitation payment would emerge as a pre-
ferred payment method for primary out-patients services across all three regions. We also per-
formed a second chi-square test to examine the relationship between health care providers’
characteristics and their preferred payment method. Subsequently, we performed a multino-
mial logic regression model for healthcare providers’ preference for payment method for out-
patients services with three alternatives: fee-for-service (1), G-DRG (2), capitation (3) with fee-
for-service being the reference category. Our outcome of interest was “preferred payment
method” and the explanatory variables were respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics.
Healthcare providers in Ashanti region only were then asked to rate their experiences with the
capitation payment policy based on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “don’t know” (0) to
“strongly agree” (4). This was done to estimate mean scores of 21 performance related state-
ments on the capitation policy to assess performance of the policy from the view point of
healthcare providers in the Ashanti region where capitation was being piloted. All the analyses
were done using Stata version 13 and Excel 2010.
Table 1. Basic socio-demographic and health service/NHIS indicators.
Indicator Ashanti Volta Central National
a. Socio-demographics Ghana Statistical Service (GSS), 2013
Regions’ population relative to national population (%) (2010 PHC) 19.4 8.6 8.9 24,658,823
Economically active population 19.1 8.4 8.6 43.9
Regions’ population employed (%) (2010) 18.6 8.6 8.5
Self-employed of the employed (%) 65.5 75.3 69.2 64.9
Population density (km2) 196 103 224.1 103
Regions’ urban population (%) 60.6 33.7 47.1 50.9
Sex ratio (males/100 females) 94 92.8 91 95.2
Households 1,126,216 495,603 526,764 5,467,136
Average household size 4.1 4.2 4.0 4.4
Regions’ literate population (%) 82.6 73.5 78.2 74.1
b. NHIS service availability (NHIA, 2013)
Number of NHIA District Offices 25 15 13 166
Active NHIS card-bearing members 1,715,174 910,559 866,831 10,145,196
Active members to regional population (%) 34 28 23 35
NHIS-credentialed service providers (2013) 619 321 334 3,832
c. Health personnel availability (GHS 2013)
Percentage share of health professionals 18.2 8.5 8.6
Percentage share of nurses (Professional) 45.5 53.4 39.3
Percentage share of nurses (Enrolled) 54.5 46.6 60.7
Number of Doctors 96 36 26 n/a
Number of Community Health Nurses 157 264 130 n/a
d. Health service utilization and cost (NHIA 2013)
OPD utilization (per member) 2.62 2.63 2.18 2.64
IPD Utilization (per member) 0.17 0.20 0.14 0.18
OPD claims expenditure (GHC per member) 54.52 29.50 42.22 22.14
IPD claims expenditure (GHC per member 35.67 24.33 15.41 41.61
Sources: GSS 2010 Population and Housing Census, 2013. Available at www.statsghana.gov.gh NHIA Annual Report, 2013. Available at www.nhia.gov.gh; NHIA
Statistical Bulletin, 2013; GHS Annual Report 2013. Available at www.ghanahealthservice.org
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0221195.t001
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Ethical considerations
We obtained ethical approval (certified protocol number: UG-ECH 057/13-14) from the Uni-
versity of Ghana Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (ISSER) Ethics Com-
mittee for Humanities (ECH). We had earlier sought official permission from the office of the
Director-General of the Ghana Health Service (approval letter dated 18/02/2014) to use the
NHIS-credentialed health care providers for the study. All respondents who agreed to partici-
pate in the survey signed a consent agreement after they were informed that their participation
in the study was optional, and their right to privacy was guaranteed.
Results
Background characteristics of respondents
One hundred and seventy-three (173) out of 200 healthcare providers sampled for the study
participated in the survey (representing 86.5% response rate) of which 87 (50%) were females
(Table 2). The average age of respondents was 44 years (SD = 11.33). Seventy-two of the
respondents (42%) were in Ashanti region, and 121 (70%) were in the urban setting. Seventy
respondents (40%) occupied positions other than medical officer, medical assistant, and
Nurse-in-charge. One hundred and thirty-three of the respondents (65%) worked in quasi-
government healthcare facilities and 134 (78%) were in the hospital level settings. Respon-
dents’ average age in practice was 11.18 years (SD = 9.62).
Healthcare providers’ preference for mechanism of payment
Among the different type of payment methods used by the NHIA, majority of healthcare pro-
viders preferred to be paid by the G-DRG method, followed by capitation for all type of ser-
vices, except diagnostics (Fig 1)
Relationship between healthcare providers’ characteristics and preferred
payment mechanism for primary outpatient services
Results of the bivariate analysis showed that healthcare providers’ preference for payment method
for primary outpatient services differed significantly by their region of residence (p<0.001). How-
ever, all other socio-demographic characteristics showed no significant association (Table 4).
The multinomial logic model revealed that being a female is significantly associated with a
1.32 decrease in the relative log odds of showing preference for G-DRG over fee-for-service
payment method (Table 5). However, being a healthcare provider in the Volta region was sig-
nificantly associated with a 1.89 increase in the relative log odds of showing preference for fee-
for-service payment method and a 2.254 decrease in the relative log odds of showing prefer-
ence for capitation payment versus fee-for-service. Healthcare providers’ setting (urban/rural)
showed a positive association at 10% significance level (p = 0.051) for G-DRG relative to fee-
for-service. Being a Medical Assistant was also significantly associated with a 2.465 increase in
relative log odds of showing preference for capitation relative to fee-for-service.
Attitude of health care providers in Ashanti region towards capitation
payment policy
Results of analysis on the 21 performance statements on the capitation payment policy in the
Ashanti region are summarized in Table 6.
Respondents scored most of the statements halfway between “disagree” and “agree” on the
5-point Likert scale. The performance statement “Capitation is a good way of eliminating
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provider shopping” was scored the highest, halfway between “disagree” and “agree” while “The
capitated rate is enough to cover the primary OPD expenses on the insured clients”, was scored
the lowest, halfway between “strongly disagree” and “disagree”. Results of the descriptive statis-
tics also showed that respondents acknowledge that capitation will ensure continuity of care
through referral system, slows down growth in utilization and reduce NHIA expenditure.
Discussion
Healthcare providers’ preference for payment mechanism and their
attitude towards capitation payment method
Different payment methods attract different responses from providers; and provider percep-
tion of a payment method could influence their preference for a particular payment method.
Table 2. Background characteristics of respondents.
Variable n (%)
Age (years)
<44 83 (48.0)
44+ 90 (52.0)
Mean = 44.30; SD = 11.33
Gender
Male 86 (49.7)
Female 87 (50.3)
Region
Ashanti 72 (41.6)
Volta 48 (27.7)
Central 53 (30.6)
Setting
Urban 121 (69.9)
Rural 52 (30.1)
Primary status at facility
Medical officer 33 (19.2)
Medical assistant 21 (12.2)
Nurse-in-charge 49 (28.5)
Other (health workers) 70 (40.1)
Years in practice
<11 113 (65.3)
11+ 60 (34.7)
Mean = 11.18;SD = 9.62
Facility ownership
Quasi-government 65 (37.6)
Mission 56 (32.4)
Private 52 (30.1)
Facility type
CHPS 7 (4.0)
Health centre 6 (3.5)
Clinic 21 (12.1)
Maternity home 5 (2.9)
Hospital 134 (77.5)
Note: CHPS means Community-Based Health Planning and Services
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0221195.t002
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Findings from our study show that the G-DRG is the most preferred payment method for
many providers across the three regions. The data, however, show that the Volta region exhib-
ited high consistency in their preference for the G-DRG and their unwillingness to accept capi-
tation and fee-for-service payment methods. In the Ashanti region, looking at the absolute
proportions, capitation payment appears to be the preferred payment method for both pri-
mary and non-primary out-patients services as well as in-patients services. However, consider-
ing that all three payment methods scored below 50%, it could be said that providers in the
Ashanti region neither accept nor reject any of the payment methods in full. The same may be
said of the Central region which exhibited similar trend in the analysis. The situation is, how-
ever, different in the Volta region where providers reject capitation as a payment method. By
implication, one could conjecture that providers in the Volta region are more likely to resist
the implementation of capitation payment in the region while those in Ashanti and Central
regions are likely to accommodate its implementation. The reasons adduced for the initial
resistance to the introduction of capitation payment in the Ashanti region, which attracted
widespread, and to some extent, negative media reportage, may have negatively influenced the
perception of providers in the Volta region to express their unwillingness to accept capitation
as a payment method under the NHIS. The trend in Ashanti suggests that after resisting its
introduction at the initial stage, providers in the region may have later recognized and, there-
fore, come to terms with the positive attributes of capitation payment method. This may be
said to have a reflection in the performance statements 1, 2, 5, 6, 14 and 15 (Table 6) that were
scored between 2.72 and 2.83 by health care providers. These statements were a mix of positive
and negative attributes of capitation payment method and considering that all the negative
attributes scored less compared to the positive attributes one may infer that providers’ appreci-
ation of positive attributes outweighs the negative ones.
Earlier studies on the capitation implementation in the Ashanti region [12] and [13]
reported of fierce resistance to the capitation policy by medical professionals, civil society
Fig 1. Provider preference for payment method by type of service. Results of the chi-square test showed that healthcare providers’ preference for
payment method differed significantly (p<0.001) across all the different types of health care services by region of residence (Table 3). The results
further showed that providers in Ashanti region prefer capitation over G-DRG and fee-for-service payments for primary outpatients’ services
(47%), non-primary outpatients’ services (39%) and inpatients services (37%). Health care providers in the Volta region preferred G-DRG (79%) to
capitation and fee-for-service payments while those in Central showed no clear preference for any particular payment method.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0221195.g001
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organizations and politicians especially during the pre-implementation and early stages of
implementations for what they perceived as its potential negative effect on primary care deliv-
ery. The initial resistance may be attributed to the reported lack of clarity in the minds of pro-
viders between the capitation payment and the G-DRG [14] and as reported in one of Ghana’s
national newspapers, the chairman of the Society of Private Medical and Dental Practitioners
(SPMDP) admitted that “lack of education caused the controversy and misunderstanding
between the Society of Private Medical and Dental Practitioners in the region and the National
Health Insurance Authority” (Ghana News Agency in The Daily Guide Newspaper of 01/12/
2012). This is also confirmed by Dodoo who noted that stakeholder understanding of the capi-
tation payment policy was generally low during pre-implementation and implementation peri-
ods which negatively affected their interest and position on the policy [15] leading to the
perception that the policy was detrimental to health care providers’ capacity to provide quality
healthcare. The same can be deduced from a study by Koduah et al [13] who pointed out that
perceived and real bureaucratic power which characterized the pre-implementation and
implementation stages of the pilot pushed the providers to assert their own powers to “contest
Table 3. Healthcare providers’ preferred payment mechanism by region.
Region Fee-for-service GDRG Capitation Total Chi-square p-value
n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%)
Primary outpatient services
Ashanti 20 (28.2) 18 (25.4) 33 (46.5) 71 (100.0) 40.48 <0.001
Volta 7 (14.6) 38 (79.2) 3 (6.2) 48 (100.0)
Central 17 (32.1) 18 (34.0) 18 (34.0) 53 (100.0)
Non primary outpatient services
Ashanti 21 (30.4) 21 (30.4) 27 (39.1) 69 (100.0) 39.30 <0.001
Volta 6 (12.5) 38 (79.2) 4 (8.3) 48 (100.0)
Central 20 (37.7) 16 (30.2) 17 (32.1) 53 (100.0)
Inpatient services
Ashanti 20 (28.2) 25 (35.2) 26 (36.6) 71 (100.0) 30.94 <0.001
Volta 6 (12.5) 38 (79.2) 4 (8.3) 48 (100.0)
Central 17 (33.3) 17 (33.3) 17 (33.3) 51 (100.0)
Medicines
Ashanti 22 (31.0) 26 (36.6) 23 (32.4) 71 (100.0) 29.75 <0.001
Volta 6 (12.5) 37 (77.1) 5 (10.4) 48 (100.0)
Central 17 (32.1) 15 (28.3) 21 (39.6) 53 (100.0)
Emergencies
Ashanti 21 (30.0) 33 (47.1) 16 (22.9) 70 (100.0) 29.45 <0.001
Volta 6 (12.5) 39 (81.2) 3 (6.2) 48 (100.0)
Central 13 (24.5) 19 (35.8) 21 (39.6) 53 (100.0)
Diagnostics
Ashanti 24 (33.8) 29 (40.8) 18 (25.4) 71 (100.0) 38.52 <0.001
Volta 5 (10.4) 41 (85.4) 2 (4.2) 48 (100.0)
Central 20 (37.7) 15 (28.3) 18 (34.0) 53 (100.0)
Referral cases
Ashanti 21 (29.6) 32 (45.1) 18 (25.4) 71 (100.0) 26.18 <0.001
Volta 6 (12.5) 39 (81.2) 3 (6.2) 48 (100.0)
Central 13 (24.5) 20 (37.7) 20 (37.7) 53 (100.0)
Note: IPD = Inpatient Department; OPD = Outpatient Department; G-DRG = Ghana Diagnosis Related Groupings
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0221195.t003
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and resist various aspects of the policy and its implementation arrangements” without recourse
to the technical arguments that are in favour of the capitation payment method. Another key
reason for the initial resistance was the perception that the introduction of capitation payment
policy in the Ashanti was politically motivated [13], [16],[17] to induce a reduction in the qual-
ity of care in the region and thereby cause untimely deaths of potential voters who are per-
ceived to be sympathisers of the then opposition New Patriotic Party.
One may also not rule out the fact that providers’ perceived low capitated rates contributed
to the initial resistance as reported by Dodoo [15] and Opoku et al [18]. Providers felt that the
per capita rate was low [13], non- risk adjusted [19], [13] and lacked clarity on how the per
capita rates were calculated [13],[17]. Another plausible reason for the initial resistance was
that providers perceived capitation as exposing their facilities to financial risk [12], [18], [19]
as may also be inferred from performance statement 19 (Table 6) that was scored about the
Table 4. Healthcare providers’ characteristics and preferred payment mechanism for primary outpatient services.
Variable Fee-for-service GDRG Capitation Total Chi-square p-value
n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%)
Age (years) 3.71 0.295
<44 26 (31.3) 33 (39.8) 24 (28.9) 83 (100.0)
44+ 18 (20.0) 41 (45.6) 31 (34.4) 90 (100.0)
Mean = 44.30; SD = 11.33
Gender 4.13 0.248
Male 17 (19.8) 41 (47.7) 27 (31.4) 86 (100.0)
Female 27 (31.0) 33 (37.9) 27 (31.0) 87 (100.0)
Region 40.48 <0.001
Ashanti 20 (28.2) 18 (25.4) 33 (46.5) 71 (100.0)
Volta 7 (14.6) 38 (79.2) 3 (6.2) 48 (100.0)
Central 17 (32.1) 18 (34.0) 18 (34.0) 53 (100.0)
Setting 7.68 0.053
Urban 37 (30.6) 49 (40.5) 35 (28.9) 121 (100.0)
Rural 7 (13.5) 25 (48.1) 19 (36.5) 51 (100.0)
Primary status at facility 18.58 0.099
Medical officer 7 (21.2) 19 (57.6) 6 (18.2) 33 (100.0)
Medical assistant 2 (9.5)) 11 (52.4) 8 (38.1) 21 (100.0)
Nurse-in-charge 12(24.5) 23 (46.9) 14 (28.6) 49 (100.0)
Other 22 (31.9) 21 (30.4) 26 (37.7) 69 (100.0)
Years in practice 5.47 0.141
<11 31 (27.4) 52 (46.0) 30 (26.6) 113 (100.0)
11+ 13 (21.8) 22 (36.7) 24 (40.0) 60 (100.0)
Mean = 11.18;SD = 9.62
Facility ownership 4.31 0.634
Quasi-government 14 (21.54) 29 (44.6) 22 (33.9) 65 (100.0)
Mission 14 (25.0) 23 (41.1) 19 (33.9) 56 (100.0)
Private 16 (30.8) 22 (42.3) 13 (25.0) 51 (100.0)
Facility type 3.7 0.988
CHPS 1 (14.3) 3 (42.9) 3 (42.9) 7 (100.0)
Health centre 1 (16.7) 2 (33.3) 3 (50.0) 6 (100.0)
Clinic 6 (28.9) 7 (33.3) 8 (38.1) 21 (100.0)
Maternity home 2 (40.0) 2 (40.0) 1 (20.0) 5 (100.0)
Hospital 34 (25.4) 60 (44.8) 39 (29.1) 134 (100.0)
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0221195.t004
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lowest (1.8) by the health care providers. It is, therefore, plausible to also attribute the seeming
preference of providers in the Ashanti region for capitation which scored 46% being the high-
est to speculation among the public that providers may have identified weaknesses in the
design and implementation arrangements and are, therefore, taking advantage to “game” the
system. The latter calls for concern and the NHIA may have to critically study the system and
improve on the implementation process to avert any such attitude of providers, if indeed the
speculation can be substantiated.
Strengths and limitations
Our study finds strength in the survey design which is relatively suitable for the collection of
substantial data on socio-demographics, perception, attitude and behaviour and as such, is
Table 5. Multinomial logic model of providers’ preferred payment mechanism for primary OPD.
Variable G-DRG Capitation
Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z
Age (years)
<44 0b
44+ .577 .537 0.282 .856 .555 0.123
Gender
Male 0b
Female -1.32 .535 0.013 -.873 .561 0.120
Region
Ashanti 0b
Volta 1.89 .717 0.008 -2.254 1.011 0.026
Central .226 .539 0.674 -.525 .524 0.316
Setting
Urban 0b
Rural 1.113 .569 0.051 .940 .584 0.108
Primary Status at facility
Medical officer 0b
Medical assistant .997 1.024 0.330 2.465 1.152 0.032
Nurse-in-charge .832 .770 0.280 .233 .916 0.799
Other .194 .690 0.779 .168 .788 0.830
Years in practice
<11 0b
11+ -.137 .543 0.801 .169 .540 0.753
Facility ownership
(Quasi)-government 0b
Mission -.737 .577 0.202 -.193 .574 0.737
Private .069 .546 0.899 -.292 .587 0.618
Facility type
Health Centre 0b
Clinic -.726 1.426 0.610 -1.511 1.394 0.278
Maternity home -.812 1.657 0.624 -1.778 1.809 0.326
Hospital -.384 1.321 0.771 -.544 1.271 0.668
CHPS -.009 1.775 0.996 1.124 1.764 0.524
_cons .302 1.515 0.842 .805 1.501 0.592
Note: Reference category is fee-for-service; 0b: reference variables; G-DRG: Ghana diagnostic related groups; OPD: Out-patient department
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0221195.t005
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widely used in areas such as health and social sciences. We, acknowledge some limitations, one
being the lack of in-depth interviews which could have provided opportunity to probe deeper
into respondents’ responses to better understand the reasons for their preference of payment
method. Another limitation is the comparison among the three regions with some background
differences. We, however, also acknowledge the similarities in the demographic and socio-eco-
nomic characteristics of the two control regions, as well as the similarities in the NHIS/health
service data across the three regions which allow for a reasonable level of comparison among
the three regions. Findings of the study therefore provide valuable input to enrich the re-
design of the capitation payment policy for a smooth implementation.
Conclusion
This paper sought to explore provider preference for payment method under the National
Health Insurance Scheme in Ghana with the view to contributing to the debate on whether or
not to migrate from pilot to full-scale implementation of the capitation payment method that
attracted resistance of providers through the leadership of their professional associations.
Findings from our analysis suggest that, in general, health care providers prefer the G-DRG
that was introduced in 2008 to capitation and fee-for-service payment methods. However, the
individual level analysis suggests that whereas providers in the Volta region are more likely not
to accept capitation as payment method, those in the Ashanti and Central regions neither
accepted nor rejected it in totality. We, therefore, conclude that although G-DRG is the most
preferred payment method for all service types across all regions, capitation payment as an
option for primary care services in Ghana should not be ruled out of the discussion. More
Table 6. Mean scores of twenty-one items capitation payment system in Ashanti region (n = 72).
Item
no.
Performance statement Mean Std.
Dev.
Std.
Err.
[95% CI]
1 Capitation is a good way of eliminating provider shopping 2.83 0.62 0.07 2.69–2.98
2 Capitation has helped to minimize multiple attendances by NHIS subscribers 2.78 0.58 0.07 2.64–2.92
3 Capitation helps to minimize overcrowding of patients at health facilities 2.36 0.95 0.11 2.14–2.59
4 Capitation can create incentives for providers to reduce quantity of service 2.32 1.00 0.12 2.08–2.56
5 Capitation can help improve the referral system in healthcare delivery 2.74 0.73 0.09 2.56–2.91
6 Capitation will lead to continuity of care 2.72 0.67 0.08 2.56–2.88
7 Capitation will encourage referrals of potentially primary care cases to higher levels of care 2.57 0.81 0.10 2.38–2.76
8 Capitation can create incentives for the prescriber to reduce the quality of service provided to the insured 2.51 0.71 0.08 2.35–2.68
9 Capitation has relieved us of the burden of OPD claims processing and submission 2.07 1.07 0.13 1.82–2.32
10 Capitation has helped to reduce our workload at the OPD. 2.32 0.74 0.09 2.14–2.50
11 Capitation is contributing to efficiency in service delivery 2.19 1.01 0.12 1.96–2.43
12 Capitation provides incentives for us to manage our resources efficiently 2.36 1.02 0.12 2.12–2.60
3 Capitation enables us to do efficient purchasing of items 2.33 0.99 0.12 2.10–2.57
14 Capitation will slow down growth in service utilization 2.72 0.99 0.12 2.49–2.96
15 Capitation can reduce NHIA’s expenditure on primary out-patients claims 2.71 1.27 0.15 2.41–3.01
16 Capitation has helped to eliminate the delayed reimbursement that is experienced under the G- DRG 2.43 0.81 0.10 2.24–2.62
17 Capitation provides a stable income for the provider because of the advance payment. 2.51 0.87 0.10 2.31–2.72
18 Capitation helps us to plan our cash flow better than before 2.39 0.97 0.11 2.16–2.62
19 The capitated rate is enough to cover the primary OPD expenses on the insured clients 1.82 1.09 0.13 1.56–2.08
20 Capitation will reduce the income of the provider 2.51 0.87 0.10 2.31–2.72
21 Capitation will create incentive for the provider to pass on the extra cost of providing care to the insured client 2.36 0.98 0.12 2.13–2.59
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0221195.t006
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education and involvement of health care providers in the (re) design, development and imple-
mentation of the policy is, however, recommended.
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